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Abstract 
Research on fatal fires and evacuation exercises yield little or no information about how 
fire victims respond to a real house fire incident where occupants’ mental stress levels differ 
greatly. Drawing upon daily records of fire incidents from the Victorian Metropolitan Fire 
Brigade and Country Fire Authority, Australia, 182 individuals who had survived accidental 
residential fires without serious injuries were interviewed. Similar to most literature, this 
paper found that electrical failure and cooking-related activities were the main causes of non-
injury house fires. The smell of smoke was the top listed cue that first alerted an individual 
(‘host’ or person in the vicinity). The majority of hosts took proactive actions when facing 
the threat of a fire, while in only one third of survived fires no attempt to extinguish the fire 
was made at the time of ignition. This study did not reveal any significant relationships 
between main activities during a fire and occupant characteristics, however, people with no 
or only basic fire safety knowledge were more likely to engage in activities such as 
attempting to extinguish a fire/ collect personal belongings/ rescue pets/ disconnect power 
source than those who had some level of fire training.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 Understanding how people might behave when facing the threat of a fire incident is 
an important field of research in order to reduce the fire deaths and injuries; however, there is 
a dearth of studies on human behaviour in residential fires. There appears to be four main 
research methodologies in human behaviour in fire, including evacuation drills1, 2, post-fire 
surveys3-5, laboratory investigation and computer simulation models6. Post-fire surveys are 
viewed more favourably to collect relatively valid and reliable information concerning 
occupant behaviour under real fire threat 7-11, in contrast to drill exercises and evacuation 
studies4. The latter type of studies provide so-called ‘controlled situations’ where occupants’ 
mental stress levels differs greatly from real fire situations where people may be intimidated 
by the signals of a fire (i.e., smoke, noise), worry about their personal belongings and loved 
ones including pets. Nonetheless, the very limited number of existing studies on human 
behaviour in fire using post-fire surveys has predominantly focused on high-rise office 
buildings. 
Over a decade ago, Purse and Kuipers (2004)11 conducted post-fire interviews with 210 
occupants from 98 non-injury building fires which occurred in the UK. This study found that 
electrical faults in appliances or mains supply and cooking were the most common causes of 
non-injury house fires. Importantly, Purse and Kuipers (2004) observed that once occupants 
had received an initial cue regarding a fire, instead of evacuating immediately, they tend to 
engage in a variety of activities before evacuation, including investigating, trying to 
extinguish the fire, helping others, calling for help, and/ or gathering personal belongings or 
pets. Proulx12 summarized a wide range of factors associated with occupants, buildings and 
fires that might have an impact on human behaviour in fire. Occupant characteristics cover 
factors related to personal profile (e.g., sex and age), knowledge and experience (e.g., past 
fire experience, fire safety training), condition at the time of event (e.g. alone vs. with others), 
personality (e.g., anxious), and role (e.g., owner). This summary of factors and characteristics 
provides a big picture and can help better understand human behaviour in fire, but only a very 
limited number of studies on residential fires have so far empirically tested the possible 
relationships. Some studies have revealed differences in the ways in which men and women 
would react to a fire1, 10. Generally, men are more likely to engage in firefighting activities 
while women are more likely to evacuate the building10.  
Extending the literature, this study analyses the information from post-fire interviews about 
human behaviour in house fires attended by the fire services where no deaths or serious 
injuries have been involved, and examines behaviour in the time sequence of fire ignition, 
identification, response, and extinguishment. The two main research questions are (i) how did 
people behave when facing the threat of a fire and (ii) what factors affect such behaviours?  
Using both qualitative and quantitative data based on interviews (more detailed than survey 
data), this paper is unique in its examination of factors affecting people’s activities during a 
house fire. Main activities during fires were compared across different cohorts involving sex 
(males vs. females), age (adults aged between 18 and 59 vs. older adults 60+), number of 
people on property (1 vs. 1+), previous fire experience (yes vs. no), fire safety knowledge 
(no/basic vs. some training), and country born (Australian-born vs. Non-Australian born).  
METHODOLOGY 
 Contact details of potential interviewees were drawn from the daily records of fire 
incidents which occurred between 2010 and 2012 collected by fire agencies in Victoria, 
Australia, including the Metropolitan Fire Brigade (MFB) and Country Fire Authority (CFA). 
Ethics approval was obtained by the Victoria University Human Research Ethics Committee 
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(HRETH 09/163). Fires were followed up if they met the following four criteria: 1) 
residential (backyard/frontyard fires were included if they involved a structure such as a 
garage or shed); 2) accidental (no cases where arson or serious criminal behaviour was 
suspected or proven were included); 3) no serious injury with extended hospitalisation or 
death involved; and 4) significant fire and/or smoke damage to the room of fire origin and/or 
dwelling reported by the fire agency.  
 
The Project Officers, who had been trained in the sensitive interviewing of people who may 
have experienced trauma, interviewed an adult who was the person most closely involved in 
the fire start, fire detection or who had escaped from the fire. Initially the potential 
interviewee was contacted by phone where possible, and the interviews were normally 
conducted at the interviewee’s home, typically where the fire had occurred. The interview was 
designed both to make the interviewee feel comfortable and to elicit the information relevant 
to the variables required for the database. 
All interviews were audiotaped. The interviewee was asked to read the Information Sheet and 
sign the Consent Form prior to the time of recording. A specific interview structure was not 
imposed as it was recognised that consenting participants will want to “tell their story” about 
the fire event and it is expected that this will occupy most of the first part of the interview. For 
this reason a series of questions were not developed.  Information that was not yielded by the 
invitation to tell their story in depth was obtained using sensitively framed questions. A 
Coding Manual that was developed specifically for the Survivors’ Database had formed a type 
of checklist for the interviewer to work through in the final part of the interview after their 
detailed ‘story’ has been told. In no case did the interviewee appear to find the interview a 
negative experience from an emotional point of view, indeed typically the interviewee found 
the retelling of the event to be a positive experience.   
In a minority of cases an extended phone interview was conducted if the person lived at a 
considerable distance from Melbourne. About two weeks prior to the date of phone interview, 
an Information Sheet and Consent Form were sent to the potential interviewee and verbal 
consent was also obtained via the phone before the recording began.  
Information about residential fire incidents was received from the MFB from June 2010 to 
December 2011 and approximately 53% of all the initial fire incidents that were assessed met 
the above inclusion criteria. Thirty percent of the potential interviewees were not contactable 
by phone or letter (at least three attempts were always made). Decline rates were quite low at 
about 17%, and were mostly because the contacted interviewee indicated that he or she had a 
language barrier to deal with an interview. Finally, 128 interviews were obtained from MFB 
attended fires. Information regarding a further 153 fire incidents that met the selection criteria 
was provided by the CFA from January 2012 to June 2012 for areas within about 200 km of 
Melbourne.  Full interviews were obtained from 68 of these CFA-attended incidents (44%). 
In total, 196 interviews were conducted and from these interviews information concerning 
182 individuals who had survived accidental residential fires without serious injuries was 
used for the current analysis. Fourteen interviews were excluded because of a large 
percentage of missing data concerning the ‘host’ (definition of host is provided below). In 
tabulating the results differences commonly occur in the number of cases across variables 
owing to information that was missing or not applicable to all cases.  
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Host 
Obviously not every fire incident was started directly by human behaviour. Nor was every 
contactable interviewee involved in fire ignition. However, in order to fully understand the 
nature of fire and human behaviour in fire, it is essential to acknowledge the important role of 
human involvement in ignition. This report utilizes the term of ‘host’ to refer to the person 
who was most closely involved in the fire start, detection, or who first called the fire brigade. 
Whether or not a host was involved in ignition was judged based upon whether a fire was 
caused by the hosts’ direct action or inactions. 
 
In the case of a fire where a person was involved in ignition, for example, a fire that was 
caused by a person placing combustible furniture directly on top of an electrical cord, this 
person was called the ‘host’ and coded as ‘involved in the ignition’. Information about such 
persons, gathered from the interview, is the focus of the research and this person was usually, 
but not exclusively, the interviewee. For example, where a child was involved in the fire start, 
such as playing with ignition sources, a parent was interviewed; for coding and data analysis 
purposes, however, the child became the ‘host’ and ‘involved in the ignition’. As another 
example, an unattended cooking-related fire was started by a 39 year old man who was living 
with his mother at the time of the fire and has been suffering post-traumatic stress disorder 
and schizophrenia. Because of the effect of his mental illness, his mother was interviewed, 
while information about the son and the fire was gathered. This man was named the ‘host’ 
and ‘involved in the ignition’.   
 
By contrast, in the case of a fire that was not caused by human direct actions, for instance by 
electrical failure of house appliances (i.e., electrical wiring, extraction fan, central heating 
unit, dryer), the host is the person who first detected fire and/or first called the fire brigade 
and/or was interviewed. This host, however, was coded as ‘not involved in the ignition’. 
Again, this person was usually, but not exclusively, the interviewee. For example, in one case 
a wife was on the property but her husband was off the property where the fire occurred, and 
she called her husband who then called the fire brigade. The husband in this case was 
interviewed because his wife did not feel confident speaking English and did not wish to be 
interviewed. In this case, information about the wife was gathered from the interview of the 
husband, and the wife became the ‘host’ and ‘not involved in the ignition’. 
 
RESULTS 
 The following sections report the findings in the sections of: 1) fire ignition; 2) fire 
identification; 3) response; 4) location change and 5) fire extinguishment. 
 
Fire ignition  
As shown in Table 1, electrical failure was the leading ignition factor of non-fatal/ injury 
house fires, followed by cooking-related activities. It is notable that unattended cooking 
behaviours accounted for 75% of cooking-related fires. Kitchen was the main room of fire 
origin, accounting for about one third of fires, followed by bedroom and ceiling/ roof space. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
 
Fire identification 
The majority of fires were first noticed by a person in the building (84.5%, 153/181), a 
further 11.6% (21/181) by a person not in the building but on the property, and a 3.9% (7/181) 
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by person off property. The latter seven fires were mainly caused by electrical failure (n = 4) 
and combustibles too close to heat (n = 2). Three of these seven fires occurred in the garage, 
two in tool storage and another two in the bedroom. 
 
Multiple methods of being alerted to the presence of a fire were recorded. In nearly a quarter 
of cases the fire cue that first alerted a fire survivor was the smell of smoke (23.6%, 43/182), 
followed by the sight of flames/ glow of fire (19.2%, 35/182). Other often-reported fire cues 
included that the person heard sounds from the fire, saw smoke, or heard an activated smoke 
alarm.  
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
 
Response: factors affecting main activities during fire 
Table 3 lists the main activities undertaken by the hosts during the fire incidents. It should be 
noted that only the first two activities (based on the time sequence) that each individual 
undertook were recorded. Sometimes, the activities might have occurred concurrently. For 
example, a host might have called the fire brigade while investigating the fire. Because all the 
non-injury fires in this study were fire brigade attended, activity of ‘calling fire brigade’ was 
not the focus of current research. Analyses on hosts’ main activities during a fire focused 
only on hosts aged over 18 years of age (thus 18 cases were deleted). In sum, the initial two 
activities that were most engaged by the hosts were: attempted to extinguish the fire (39.0%, 
64/164), trying to alert others (26.8%, 44/164), investigating fire (18.3%, 30/164), attempted 
to rescue others (10.4%, 17/164), and attempted to rescue pets (9.8%, 16/164).  
 
Sex. As shown in Table 3, most survivors took proactive actions when sensing the signals of 
a fire. Over a third of hosts attempted to extinguish a fire, over a quarter of hosts tried to alert 
others, almost one in five investigated for a fire, one out of ten attempted to rescue others and 
another 10% attempted to rescue pets. Males and females showed similar patterns in most 
main activities during the fire. The χ2 test results indicated a statistically nonsignificant 
relationship between sex and main activities (p = 0.137). However, all individuals who were 
recorded as having behaved ‘irrationally’ in the face of a fire were females. Irrational 
behaviour refers to situations where a host’s behaviour was so concerning to others at the 
scene that some restraining behaviour was warranted. One example is a 24 year old female 
who accidentally ignited the outside furniture with a discarded cigarette. During the fire, she 
was desperate to find her dog and ran across the fire area several times and eventually she 
was restrained by the fire brigade. As another example, when the fire was out of control, a 
mother was determined to put the fire out by herself as she did not have insurance and did not 
want her house to burn down. At the end, her friend had to hit her and drag her out of the 
house as she would not listen.  
 
Age. The majority (81.8%, 121/148) of hosts were adults aged between 18 and 60 and a 
minority were aged over 60 (18.2%, 27/148) (Note-some missing data). The χ2 test results 
indicated a statistically nonsignificant relationship between age group and main activities (p 
= 0.282). A slightly higher proportion of younger adults aged between 18 and 59 than the 
elderly aged over 60 were engaged in rescuing others, partly attributable to the situation that 
the elderly are more likely to live alone while the younger adults were living with their 
families (b = 4.78, p = 0.029).  
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Number of people on property at the time of fire ignition. Information was available for 144 
fires where 20.1% (29/144) of survivors of these fires were alone on the property at the time 
of fire ignition. The χ2 test results indicated a statistically nonsignificant relationship 
(p=0.104). Investigating fires was the second most activities engaged for those who were 
alone on properties but the third for those who were not alone, after activity of trying to alert 
others. Notably, ‘alerting others (principally neighbours)’ was mentioned as one of the main 
activities by 7 hosts (24.1%, 7/29) who were alone on the property during the time of fire 
incidents. 
 
Previous fire experience. A disturbing finding was that 81.8% (108/132) of hosts reported 
that it was NOT their first time to experience fire incidents, however, no significant 
relationship was detected between previous fire experience and activities during fires 
(p=0.964).  
 
Fire safety knowledge. Hosts were asked to rate whether they have had pre-existing fire 
safety-related knowledge, training or practice prior to the fire incident, ranging from no pre-
existing knowledge, basic/ general knowledge, some specific knowledge/ learning, to 
technical/ formal training. Of 130 fires when information was available, over two thirds of 
survivors (80%, 104/130) reported that they either had, prior to their fire, no fire safety 
knowledge (5.4%, 7/130) or had only basic fire safety knowledge (74.6%, 97/130), and 20% 
(26/130) had some or specific training. Of the seven hosts who reported no fire safety 
knowledge, four were born overseas, 2 were directly involved in fire ignition but only one 
was asleep (all other six were awake and unimpaired by other conditions). The χ2 test results 
indicated a significant relationship between activities engaged during a fire and fire safety 
knowledge (p=0.019), with a slightly higher proportion of people with no or basic fire safety 
knowledge being engaged in such activities as attempted to extinguish a fire/ collect personal 
belongings/ rescue pets/ disconnect power source. 
 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
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Country born. Information was available for 135 fires and about one third of hosts were born 
overseas (33.3%, 45/135). No significant relationship was found between country born and 
main activities engaged during a fire (p = 0.461). For those who were born overseas, the 
activities untaken by most hosts were attempted to extinguish the fire (44.4%, 20/45) and 
investigating the fire (22.2%, 10/45). 
 
Host’s location change before, at ignition, during and after fire 
There was a noticeable change in terms of hosts’ locations before the fire, at ignition, during 
fire, and after incident. About 43% of hosts were located in the RFO before the fire but this 
figure dropped to 14.7% at the time of fire ignition. During the time of fire, more hosts went 
to the RFO who might be engaged in activities such as investigating or attempting to 
extinguish the fire. Unsurprisingly, the majority of survived hosts were outside of the house 
of fire origin but on the property after the fire. 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
 
Fire extinguishment 
At the time of fire services arrival, 17.6% (32/182) of fires had been extinguished. The 
majority of fires were extinguished by the fire brigade (77.6%, 142/182), with a minority 
self-extinguished. In one third of fires, there was no attempt made to extinguish the fire at the 
time of ignition. Nearly one third of hosts, and over one third of people on premises other 
than the interviewee, attempted to extinguish the fire. Where an attempt was made to 
extinguish the fire, one third of cases used water from a container, another quarter attempted 
smothering, a quarter used a garden hose, and one out of ten used a fire extinguisher. About 
6.3% of households adopted multiple methods to extinguish fires.  
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
 
Discussion 
 Consistent with findings generated by both evacuation exercises/studies and post-fire 
survey4, 7-11, this study found that instead of leaving the burning property immediately, most 
people take proactive behaviour when facing the threat of a fire. The leading five activities 
that were most engaged by the hosts were: attempted to extinguish the fire, trying to alert 
others, investigating fire, attempted to rescue others, and attempted to rescue pets. In line 
with these activities, this study found a noticeable change in terms of hosts’ locations before 
the fire, at ignition, during fire, and after incident. Only 14.7% of hosts were in the room of 
fire origin at the time of fire ignition, but this figure increased to 43.3% during the fire. The 
engagement in such activities as rescuing others/ pets or collecting personal belongings 
reinforced the fact that when facing the threat of a fire, most people undertake activities 
(including irrational behaviours) that are driven by their perceived needs. People do not 
always follow fire safety training advice of ‘get out, stay out, call the fire service out’3. 
Engagement in proactive activities during a fire and the presence in the room of fire origin 
might expose fire victims to heightened risk of dying or getting injured in a house fire.  
However, it can be argued that for these fires most people who were involved successfully 
judged that their proactive actions were safe. In ten cases people were restrained from 
exposing themselves to danger by others. 
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Consistent with the above findings, this study also found that in one third of fires, there was 
no attempt made to extinguish the fire at the time of ignition (Reasons for this were not 
pursued in this study). Where additional fire safety equipment was available, it was not 
always used. A decision not to fight a fire may have been the safest and most sensible option, 
or may have arisen (wholly or in part) from difficulties using the fire equipment, lack of 
knowledge on what would be safe to do and/or psychological stress when facing the fire (i.e., 
disorientation, anxiety). It highlights the interesting issue of whether fire agencies should 
educate and encourage people to use fire extinguishment equipment to fight small fires if 
they believe it is safe to do so, or to focus on a message of evacuation. Sufianto and Green 
(2012)13 raised the controversial idea that a society highly dependent upon the fire services 
only creates public opinion that the fire service is the only institution responsible for fire 
safety. However, if occupants are expected to do the right things during a fire, they must be 
well trained about how a fire can start, develop, and cause damage12.  
 
Different from post-fire survey studies on high-rise office building fires, this study did not 
find statistically significant relationships between activities during fire and occupant 
characteristics including sex, age, number of people on property, previous fire experience, 
and country born. However, a significant relationship was observed between activities 
engaged during a fire and fire safety knowledge (no/ basic vs. some/ specific training), with a 
slightly higher proportion of people with no or basic fire safety knowledge being engaged in 
such activities as attempting to extinguish a fire/ collect personal belongings/ rescue pets/ 
disconnect power source. All individuals that had behaved ‘irrationally’ during a fire were 
females. Via a post-fire survey of 595 survivors from a high-rise office building fire, Zhao et 
al., (2009)4 found significant relationships between human behaviour at the recognition stage 
(including searching information, discussion with other occupants, alerting other people, 
calling fire brigade, and fighting the fire) and factors including sex, education level and 
emergency training. However, Zhao et al., (2009)4 revealed nonsignificant relationships 
between activities at the response stage (including collecting personal belongings, instructing 
others to leave, sheltering in place, carrying out immediate evacuation) and factors including 
sex and education level, but a significant relationship between activities and emergency 
training. Comparing with Zhao et al., (2009)4, the current nonsignificant relationships might 
be resulted from a relatively small sample size in this study and, perhaps most importantly, a 
focus on residential fires rather than public office building fires. 
 
Consistent with previous studies12, this paper found that a smoke alarm was not the cue that 
had first alerted most fire survivors. Smoke alarm was listed as the fifth cue after the smell of 
smoke, the sight of flames/ glow of fire, sounds from the fire and the sight of smoke. 
Furthermore, 81.8% of hosts reported that it was NOT their first time of experiencing fire 
incidents, although no significant relationship was detected between previous fire experience 
and activities during fires. Barnett (2008)14 found that people aged over 18 years of age had 
approximately a 50% chance of experiencing either an attended or unattended residential fire 
within their adult lifetime. Future studies would benefit from conducting research on the 
impact of education on people who have fires repeatedly. 
 
A number of research findings appear to be very similar between Purse and Kuipers (2004, 
referred to below as PK) 11 that was conducted in the UK a decade earlier and this current 
Australian-context study (referred to below as X). Kitchen (PK 37% vs. X 34%) and 
bedroom (PK 17% vs. X 16%) were both found to be the leading two areas of fire origin. 
Electrical faults was the leading cause of non-injury house fires for both studies (PK 25% vs. 
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X 35%) and cooking accounted for over a quarter of non-injury house fires in both (PK 28% 
vs. X 25%). Both studies revealed that occupants almost never leave the burning property 
immediately, instead engaging in a number of proactive behaviours including but not limited 
to such activities as attempting to extinguish the fire, trying to alert others/ neighbours, or 
collecting personal belongings/ pets. Such consistent findings across decades and countries 
are welcome because they support the validity of the findings and thus increase the value of 
the information for fire research and community safety messages.  Specifically, the findings 
raise the question of whether fire safety messages should always advocate immediate 
evacuation where there is a fire. Clearly people engage in a range of proactive behaviours, 
some of which may be quite sensible and/or understandable in the circumstances.  The 
consistent findings about the leading causes of non-injury fires invite a call to action on how 
to best enhance the prevention of electrical fault fires and cooking fires.   
 
LIMITATIONS 
 The nonsignificant relationships documented in this study might be partly attributable 
to the relatively small sample size; it would be beneficial for future studies to undertake 
similar research with a larger sample size. Given that all interviewees were volunteers, the 
database used may not represent the whole population that have experienced fire incidents 
during the interview period. Because limited information was available from the MFB and 
CFA fire lists about the survivors, a comparison between people interviewed and those non-
contactable was not possible. Thus, the generalisability of the present results might be a 
potential problem. Further, the inherent methodological limitations associated with self-
reported surveys should be acknowledged, especially that participants might seek to present 
themselves in a favourable manner14.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 One of the most significant contributions of this study is that it collected information 
concerning human behaviours in accidental residential fires in the sequence of fire ignition, 
identification, response, and extinguishment and explored relationships between some of 
occupant characteristics and activities engaged during a fire. Previous studies on residential 
fires have relied predominantly on official statistics on fires, deaths, and injuries, but it is not 
always easy to capture the deceased’s behaviour in the absence of eyewitness accounts. 
Information from survived fires has much to offer educational or preventive programs to 
inform people about factors and actions that promote survivability. This study found that the 
majority of hosts took proactive actions when facing the threat of a fire, while in one third of 
survived fires there was no attempt made to extinguish the fire at the time of ignition. A 
decision not to fight a fire may have been the safest and most sensible option, or may have 
arisen (wholly or in part) from difficulties using the fire equipment, lack of knowledge on 
what would be safe to do and/or psychological stress when facing the fire (i.e., disorientation, 
anxiety). It highlights the interesting issue of whether fire agencies should educate and 
encourage people to use fire extinguishing equipment to fight small fires if they believe it is 
safe to do so, or to focus on a message of evacuation. 
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Table 1. Frequency distribution of fire ignition factors 
Note. The cumulative percentage is not 100% as multiple activities were recorded. 
 
Table 2. Frequency distribution of fire identification factors 
 Percentage  
(%) 
Number  
(n) 
Person who first noticed the presence of a fire 
(n=181) 
  
• Person in the building 84.5 153 
• Person on the property but not in the building 11.6 21 
• Person off property 3.9 7 
Awareness of a fire (n=182)   
• Smelt smoke 23.6 43 
• Saw flames/ glow (of fire) 19.2 35 
• Heard fire/ explosion 15.9 29 
• Saw smoke 12.1 22 
• Smoke alarm 12.1 22 
• Fire started by own action 6.6 12 
• Heard voice/ screams 2.7 5 
• Multiple  7.7 14 
 
 
 Percentage  
(%) 
Number  
(n) 
Ignition factor (n=175) a   
• Electrical failure 35.4 62 
• Cooking-related 25.2 44 
 Unattended cooking 
 Cooking other 
75.0 
25.0 
33 
11 
• Combustibles too close to heat 16.0 28 
• Lack of maintenance/ worn out 8.0 14 
• Children playing with ignition sources 6.9 12 
• Overloaded  3.4 6 
• Discarded cigarettes 2.9 5 
• Others (i.e., open fire, design fault, lightning, improper 
start up/ shut down) 
6.9 12 
Room of fire origin (n=182)   
• Kitchen  33.9 62 
• Bedroom  16.4 30 
• Ceiling/ roof space 9.3 17 
• Toilet/ bathroom 7.7 14 
• Garage  6.6 12 
• Lounge room 5.5 10 
• Laundry  3.3 6 
• Veranda/ porch 3.3 5 
• Wall cavity/ surface 3.3 6 
• Others (i.e., spa room, under house, backyard/ 
frontyard, carport, rubbish area) 
10.7 20 
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Table 3. Hosts’ main activities during fire 
 Total 
% 
(n) 
 
Sex  Age Number of 
people on 
property 
Previous fire 
experience 
Fire safety knowledge * Country born 
  Male Female 18-
60 
60+ One More 
than one 
Yes No No and 
basic 
Specific 
training 
Australian-
born 
Overseas-born 
Main activities during 
fire 
(164) (64)  (84) (121) (27) (29) (115) (108) (24) (104) (26) (90) (45) 
• Attempted to 
extinguish fire 
39.0  53.1  35.7  41.3  51.9  51.7  41.7  38.9  54.2  46.2  38.5  41.1  44.4  
• Trying alert others 26.8  31.3  28.6  28.9  33.3  24.1  25.2  32.4  20.8  26.9  34.6  25.6  2.2  
• Investigating fire 18.3  26.6  15.5  19.8  22.2  34.5  15.6  21.3  25.0   22.1  23.1  22.2  22.2  
• Attempted to rescue 
others 
10.4 7.8  11.9  13.2  3.7  0 13.9  11.1  8.3   12.5  11.5  13.3  6.7  
• Attempted to rescue 
pets 
9.8  10.9  10.7  11.6  7.4  3.4  13.0  11.1  12.5  13.5  3.8  13.3  4.4  
• Extinguished the fire 9.1  10.9  9.5  9.9  11.1  3.4  11.3  9.3  12.5  7.7  26.9  7.8  15.6  
• Irrational action  6.1  0 11.9  7.4  3.7  3.4  7.8  4.6  12.5  6.7  7.7  6.7  6.7  
• Disconnected power 
source 
4.9  4.7  6.0  6.6  0 3.4  6.1  6.5  0 6.7  0 4.4  6.7  
• Attempted to collect 
personal belongs  
3.0  4.7  2.4  3.3  3.7  0 3.5  4.6  0 4.8  0 4.4  2.2  
• Unable to act 0.6  1.6  0 0 3.7  0 0.9  0 0 0 0 1.1  0 
• Trying to extinguish 
flames on body 
0.6  1.6  0 0.8  0 0 0.9  0 4.2  0 0 1.1  0 
Notes. The cumulative percentage is not 100% as multiple activities were recorded. * indicates p< 0.05. 
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Table 4. Hosts’ location before fire, at ignition, during fire and after fire 
   Location % (n) Before 
fire 
At 
ignition 
During 
fire 
After fire 
Involved in ignition (at exact point of) - 4.3 (7) - - 
In RFO  42.7 (70) 10.4 (17) 43.3 (71) 2.4 (4) 
In house/ building of RFO but not in RFO 49.4 (81) 67.1 (110) 37.8 (62) 8.5 (14) 
Outside of house/ building of RFO but on 
property 
3.0 (5) 6.1 (10) 16.5 (27) 81.1 (133) 
Off property of fire origin 1.8 (3) 6.1 (10) 0.6 (1) 4.9 (8) 
On property but in separate dwelling 2.4 (4) 5.5 (9) 1.8 (3) - 
Note. – indicates not applicable. RFO indicates room of fire origin. 
 
 
 
Table 5. Fire extinguishment 
 Percentage  
(%) 
Number  
(n) 
Description of fire at time of fire services arrival 
(n=182) 
  
• Fire extinguished 17.6 32 
• Confined to room of fire origin 53.8 98 
• Beyond room of fire origin 28.6 52 
Who extinguished the fire (n=182)   
• Fire brigade 77.5 141 
• Person on premises 10.4 19 
• Person off premises 3.8 7 
• Interviewee 5.5 10 
• Fire self-extinguished 2.7 5 
Who attempted to extinguish fire (n=182)   
• No one attempted 33.5 61 
• Person on premises at time of ignition 32.4 59 
• Interviewee  28.0 51 
• Person off premises at time of ignition 6.0 11 
How attempted to extinguish fire (n=120)   
• Water from container 33.3 40 
• Smothering  25.8 31 
• Garden hose 23.3 28 
• Fire extinguisher 10.8 13 
• Multiple  6.7 8 
 
 
 
 
 
